Resuelta evidente la desigualdad que ha develado la crisis sanitaria a nivel global. Sin embargo, no se trata de una fotografía actual, sino que ha puesto de manifiesto las falencias estructurales del sistema económico político global y, con ello, los devastadores efectos sobre el ser humano en todas sus dimensiones. Las consecuencias de la pandemia no son homogéneas dentro de una misma sociedad. Existen sectores que se han vuelto más ricos y otros más pobres. Las distancias en salud, bienestar y (...) dignidad de los individuos han aumentado y estamos ante una crisis de que esta injusticia se siga calcificando. El ser humano no sólo tiene que sobrevivir sino lograr la fundamental biopsicosocial realización tanto individual como colectiva. Por lo tanto, es imperativo, recuperar al Otro, al necesitado, dentro del discurso y, sobre todo, en la acción política, mirando al Otro como un fin en sí mismo, y no como un medio. Este es el origen y debe volver a ser la finalidad primordial de la política interna y externa de cada gobierno. Para ello, la reflexión filosófica nos proporciona nuevas perspectivas para reestructurar la realidad, cambiando, y mejorando, las escalas de valores y nuestro modo de actuar. La postpandemia nos plantea un único objetivo, el restaurar y reactivar las verdaderas relaciones intersubjetivas, rehumanizando al hombre, es decir, volviendo a la raíz de la esencia de toda sociedad, que no es otra que el ser humano mismo, como un fin en sí mismo. No se podrá lograr de manera inmediata, por lo tanto es fundamental recanalizar todas las herramientas e instituciones políticas hacia y para el bienestar del hombre, sin devastar su entorno, donde la reflexión filosófica es primordial para construir un nuevo mundo. (shrink)

In this paper we will analyze critically the traditional interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity in the Chilean Constitution of 1980 and its influence on the configuration of our economic constitution. To this end, firstly we will study the traditional interpretation of the subsidiarity, trying to demonstrate its faults, and its relationship with neoliberalism. After, we will evaluate the influence of this position on the constitutional jurisprudence of recent years. And finally, considering the crisis of legitimacy of our political system, (...) we believe that the Welfare state could be a solution to the constitutional problem. (shrink)

ResumenSe trata, en esta investigación, de hacer una aproximación moral, política y filosófica al teatro español del Siglo de Oro a través de dos de sus más paradigmáticos creadores: Lope de Vega y Calderón de la Barca. Me apoyo para ello en una definición política de lo trágico que se encuentra arraigada en la tradición greco-latina del género. Se investigará si en las obras analizadas de Lope y Calderón lo trágico aún se encuentra delimitado por lo político, deduciéndose, como se (...) verá, que en Lope tal relación ha desaparecido, mientras que en Calderón se mantiene, pero eliminándose el enfoque dialéctico debido a la afirmación de los códigos del Honor.Palabras claveTragedia española, tradición clásica, estética, teoría de la literatura, literatura comparadaAbstractThis paper is a moral, philosophical and political approach to the theatre of Spanish Golden Age based on a philosophical and political conception of the tragic literature. We focus our attention on two classic authors: Lope de Vega and Calderon de la Barca. A comparative approach between Greek tragedy and the Spanish plays will help us define if the tragic bias is limited by a political aspect in Lope and Calderon. Finally, we intend to deduce that politics have disappeared in Lope´s plays and still exist in Calderon, although not in a dialectical way due to the code of Honour.KeywordsSpanish Tragedy, classical tradition, Aesthetics, Literary Theory, Comparative Literature. (shrink)

ResumenSe trata, en esta investigación, de hacer una aproximación moral, política y filosófica al teatro español del Siglo de Oro a través de dos de sus más paradigmáticos creadores: Lope de Vega y Calderón de la Barca. Me apoyo para ello en una definición política de lo trágico que se encuentra arraigada en la tradición greco-latina del género. Se investigará si en las obras analizadas de Lope y Calderón lo trágico aún se encuentra delimitado por lo político, deduciéndose, como se (...) verá, que en Lope tal relación ha desaparecido, mientras que en Calderón se mantiene, pero eliminándose el enfoque dialéctico debido a la afirmación de los códigos del Honor.Palabras claveTragedia española, tradición clásica, estética, teoría de la literatura, literatura comparadaAbstractThis paper is a moral, philosophical and political approach to the theatre of Spanish Golden Age based on a philosophical and political conception of the tragic literature. We focus our attention on two classic authors: Lope de Vega and Calderon de la Barca. A comparative approach between Greek tragedy and the Spanish plays will help us define if the tragic bias is limited by a political aspect in Lope and Calderon. Finally, we intend to deduce that politics have disappeared in Lope´s plays and still exist in Calderon, although not in a dialectical way due to the code of Honour.KeywordsSpanish Tragedy, classical tradition, Aesthetics, Literary Theory, Comparative Literature. (shrink)

Se estudia la vida y espiritualidad de la Abadesa del Convento de la Concepción de Lebrija doña Francisca de Vera discípula del visionario, profético, milenarista Gómez Camacho inspirador de la sevillana y heterodoxa Congregación de la Granada y maestra y condiscípula al mismo tiempo de Rodrigo Álvarez S.I., confesor de Santa Teresa de Jesús, quien transmitió a Sevilla esta espiritualidad milenarista y cuyos miembros jugarán un papel fundamental para la difusión masiva de la pía creencia en la Inmaculada Concepción (...) de la Virgen María. Francisca de Vera escribió dos tratados sobre la oración que se conservan manuscritos. (shrink)

Das Buch untersucht die Bedeutung des Begriffs rationalitas bei Hildegard von Bingen. Zunachst wird die Herkunft des Begriffs von der griechischen Logoslehre uber die fruhchristliche Trinitatsspekulation bis hin zur ratio-Rezeption des Fruhmittelalters beleuchtet. Auf diesem Hintergrund entfaltet der zweite Teil die anthropologisch-theologische Bedeutung von rationalitas fur das Weltbild Hildegards.

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

All these specialist aspects of one life are different facets of the intellectual diamond which scintillates in the huge quarry of The Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. This is the quintessential man, the bundle of contradictions passionately dedicated to intellect, at times carrying the rational argument to irrational extremes; the natural-born emotional adventurer forever hampered by orphaned youth and too-early marriage. This Russell in the round is greater than the sum of his constituent parts, a man of (...) epic proportions, struggling through a lifetime beset with frustration and near-disaster; in youth the constitutional sceptic, in old age the sometimes splendid figure with "courage never to submit or yield.". (shrink)

Higher education institutions worldwide have begun to embrace sustainability issues and engage their campuses and communities in such efforts, which have led to the development of integrity and ethical values in these organizations and their relationships with stakeholders. This study provides a literary review of the concept of University Social Responsibility (USR) and sustainability programs worldwide, grouped into eight research streams: conceptual framework, strategic planning and USR, educating on USR, spreading USR, reporting and USR, evaluation of USR, barriers and accelerators (...) and case studies. The aforementioned research streams served as a context to explore best practices in sustainability on a global basis. (shrink)

In this reprint of Law's Empire,Ronald Dworkin reflects on the nature of the law, its given authority, its application in democracy, the prominent role of interpretation in judgement, and the relations of lawmakers and lawgivers to the community on whose behalf they pronounce. For that community, Law's Empire provides a judicious and coherent introduction to the place of law in our lives.Previously Published by Harper Collins. Reprinted (1998) by Hart Publishing.

Reasoning About Knowledge is the first book to provide a general discussion of approaches to reasoning about knowledge and its applications to distributed ...

We show that in the Maxwell–Lorentz theory of classical electrodynamics most initial values for fields and particles lead to an ill-defined dynamics, as they exhibit singularities or discontinuities along light-cones. This phenomenon suggests that the Maxwell equations and the Lorentz force law ought rather to be read as a system of delay differential equations, that is, differential equations that relate a function and its derivatives at different times. This mathematical reformulation, however, leads to physical and philosophical consequences for the ontological (...) status of the electromagnetic field. In particular, fields cannot be taken as independent degrees of freedom, which suggests that one should not add them to the ontology. (shrink)

It is proved that Vaught's conjecture is true for modules over an arbitrary countable hereditary noetherian prime ring.

It is proved that Vaught's conjecture is true for modules over an arbitrary countable serial ring. It follows from the structural result that every module with few models over a (countable) serial ring is ω-stable.

Gift of utterance: expanding vocabularies for truth -- Dainty as candle-lights: veiled truths and shadowy lies -- Philomela and the risk of history -- Truth: a muddy sprout -- No auditors in the courtroom of history.

From the thirties "sinarquismo" became an important sociopolitic and socioideological strength in contrast with the Mexican posrevolutionary political system. This article makes an attempts to give and answer to some questions : what was the "sinarquismo" origin and development? Under what bases did it take root socially, politically and ideologically speaking?. How was "sinarquismo" linked to the global context of conservative, catholic and right-winger movements? And what was the story of the "sinarquista" movement in the middle occident of Mexico?

According to the doctrine of Super-Humeanism, the world’s mosaic consists only of permanent matter points and changing spatial relations, while all the other entities and features figuring in scientific theories are nomological parameters, whose role is merely to build the best law system. In this paper, I develop an argument against Super-Humeanism by pointing out that it is vulnerable to and does not have the resources to solve the well-known problem of immanent comparisons. Firstly, I show that it cannot endorse (...) a fundamentalist solution à la Lewis, since its two pillars—a minimalist ontology and a best system account of lawhood—would generate, together, a tedious problem of internal coherence. Secondly, I consider anti-fundamentalist strategies, proposed within Humeanism, and find them inapplicable to the Super-Humean doctrine. The concern is that, since it is impossible to choose the best law system within Super-Humeanism, this doctrine may be charged with incoherence. (shrink)

Many arguments have been made against gene editing. This paper addresses the commonly invoked argument that gene editing violates human dignity and is ultimately a subversion of human nature. There are several drawbacks to this argument. Above all, the concept of what human dignity means is unclear. It is not possible to condemn a practice that violates human dignity if we do not know exactly what is being violated. The argument’s entire reasoning is thus undermined. Analyses of the arguments involved (...) in this discussion have often led to the conclusion that gene editing contravenes the principle of genetic identity (genetic immutability) thereby subverting a requisite of human dignity and ultimately threatening human nature. This paper refutes these arguments and shows that any opposition to gene editing cannot rely on the human dignity argument. (shrink)

Young children, in general, appear to have a strong drive to explore the environment in ways that reveal its underlying causal structure. But are they really attuned specifically to casual information in this quest for understanding, or do they show equal interest in other types of non-obvious information about the world? To answer this question, we introduced 20 three-year-old children to two puppets who were anxious to tell the child about a set of novel artifacts and animals. One puppet consistently (...) described causal properties of the items while the other puppet consistently described carefully matched non-causal properties of the same items. After a familiarization period in which children learned which type of information to expect from each informant, children were given the opportunity to choose which they wanted to hear describe each of eight pictured test items. On average, children chose to hear from the informant that provided causal descriptions on 72% of the trials. This preference for causal information has important implications for explaining the role of conceptual information in supporting early learning and may suggest means for maximizing interest and motivation in young children. (shrink)

Replicability is usually considered to be one of the cornerstones of science; however, the growing recognition of nonreplicable experiments and studies in scientific journals—a phenomenon that has been called ‘replicability crisis’—has spurred a debate on the meaning, function, and significance of replicability in science. Amid this discussion, it has become clear that replicability is not a monolithic concept; what is still controversial is exactly how the distinction between different kinds of replicability should be laid out terminologically and conceptually, and to (...) what extent it bears on the more general debate on the centrality of replicability in science. This paper’s goals are to clarify the different uses of the terms related to replicability and, more importantly, to conceptually specify the kinds of replicability and their respective epistemic functions. (shrink)

One dimension of cognitive success concerns getting it right: having many true beliefs and no false ones. Another dimension of cognitive success concerns using the right concepts. For example, using a concept of a person that systematically excludes people of certain demographics from its extension is a sort of cognitive deficiency. This view, if correct, tasks inquirers with critically examining the concepts they are using and perhaps replacing those concepts with new and better ones. This task is often referred to (...) as “conceptual engineering”. However, so far it is unclear what exactly happens in cases of conceptual engineering. How does language change when we engineer a concept? This article offers an answer. I propose a view on which, when speakers assess the truth of propositions, they often rely on assumptions with regard to what is required for their truth. For example, when speakers assess whether unborn fetuses are people, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is required to be a person. Based on this idea, I develop a model of conceptual engineering according to which speakers “engineer concepts” when they change how they assess the truth of propositions. For example, speakers engineer the concept of a person when they change how they assess the truth of the proposition that unborn fetuses are people. (shrink)

In 1993, Professor of Jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin of Oxford University and Professor of Law at New York University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s thirteenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia." Dworkin is Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University. He received B.A. degrees from both Harvard College and Oxford University, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School and clerked for Judge Learned Hand. He was (...) associated with a law firm in New York (Sullivan and Cromwell) and was a professor of law at Yale University Law School from 1962-1969. He has been Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and Fellow of University College since 1969. He has a joint appointment at Oxford and at NYU where he is a professor both in the Law School and the Philosophy Department. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Dworkin is the author of many articles in philosophical and legal journals as well as articles on legal and political topics in the New York Review of Books. He has written Taking Rights Seriously (1977), A Matter of Principle (1985), Law’s Empire (1986), Philosophical Issues in Senile Dementia (1987), A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990), Life’s Dominion (1993), and Freedom’s Law (1996). (shrink)

Do numbers exist? Carnap (1956 [1950]) famously argues that this question can be understood in an “internal” and in an “external” sense, and calls “external” questions “non-cognitive”. Carnap also says that external questions are raised “only by philosophers” (p. 207), which means that, in his view, philosophers raise ”non-cognitive” questions. However, it is not clear how the internal/external distinction and Carnap’s related views about philosophy should be understood. This paper provides a new interpretation. I draw attention to Carnap’s distinction between (...) purely external statements, which are independent from all frameworks, and pragmatic external statements, which concern which framework one should adopt, and argue that the latter express noncognitive mental states. Specifically, I argue that “frameworks” are systems of rules for the assessment of statements, which are utterances of ordinary language sentences. Pragmatic external statements express noncognitive dispositions to follow only certain rules of assessment. For instance, “numbers exist” understood as a pragmatic external statement expresses a noncognitive disposition to use only rules of assessment according to which numbers do exist. Carnap can thereby be understood as proposing a distinctive form of noncognitivism about ontology that is in some respects analogous to norm-expressivism in metaethics. (shrink)

_Purpose:_ This study examined the relationship between the near dissociated phoria and disparity vergence eye movements. Convergence insufficiency (CI) patients before vergence therapy were compared to: (1) the same patients after vergence therapy; and (2) binocularly normal controls (BNC). _Methods:_ Sixteen subjects were studied—twelve BNC and four with CI. Measurements from the CI subjects were obtained before and after 18 h of vergence eye movement therapy. The near dissociated phoria was measured using the flashed Maddox rod technique. Vergence responses were (...) stimulated from 4° symmetrical disparity vergence step stimuli. The peak velocity of the vergence response and the magnitude of the fusion initiating component (FIC) from an independent component analysis (ICA) were calculated. A linear regression analysis was conducted studying the vergence peak velocity as a function of the near dissociated phoria where the Pearson correlation coefficient was computed. _Results:_ Before vergence therapy, the average with one standard deviation FIC magnitude of convergence responses from CI subjects was 0.29° ± 0.82 and significantly less than the FIC magnitude of 1.85° ± 0.84 for BNC ( p t -test reported that the FIC and near dissociated phoria before vergence therapy for CI subjects significantly increased to 1.49° ± 0.57 ( p p r = 0.87; p _Conclusion:_ The results have clinical translational impact in understanding the mechanism by which vergence therapy may be changing the vergence system leading to a sustained reduction in visual symptoms. (shrink)

: George Rupp's Beyond Existentialism and Zen, in its typological-structural analysis and model of religious pluralism, proffers an alternative to the dominant Kantian models (e.g., by John Hicks and Sarvepalli Radhakrish nan). The question for Rupp is not which religion is true and how to decide that issue—answered in the Kantian approach in terms of an unknowable Ding an sich that all religions, albeit imperfectly, try to approximate or conceptualize (i.e., God or the Transcendent)—but rather how do religions represent, at (...) least in principle, a structural possibility for salvation or human flourishing, however different and incompatible their distinct prima facie truth claims might be. Although the potential for a radically relativistic model is implicit in Rupp's approach, it is argued here that his Hegelian assumptions lead him to accept relativism only in a provisional ("critical") way; for Rupp, under ideal epistemic conditions (e.g., the Peircian "end of inquiry"), one final conceptualization of ultimate reality will emerge as absolute truth. In the final part of this essay a version of the relativistic model implicit in Rupp's approach is defended against both the Kantian model of Hicks et al. and Rupp's Hegelian-Peircian model, which, it is argued, is incompatible certainly with the spirit of his own typological-structural analysis, if not with the letter. In challenging what Rupp calls the truth of Zen, it is further argued that not only is more than one salvific structural possibility available to us through the different world religions but also that realizing these possibilities is principally a human responsibility, and that the cosmos is quite indifferent to and compatible with several possibilities, from the most destructive to the most conducive to human well being and flourishing. (shrink)

George Rupp's Beyond Existentialism and Zen, in its typological-structural analysis and model of religious pluralism, proffers an alternative to the dominant Kantian models (e.g., by John Hicks and Sarvepalli Radhakrish nan). The question for Rupp is not which religion is true and how to decide that issue-answered in the Kantian approach in terms of an unknowable Ding an sich that all religions, albeit imperfectly, try to approximate or conceptualize (i.e., God or the Transcendent)-but rather how do religions represent, at least (...) in principle, a structural possibility for salvation or human flourishing, however different and incompatible their distinct prima facie truth claims might be. Although the potential for a radically relativistic model is implicit in Rupp's approach, it is argued here that his Hegelian assumptions lead him to accept relativism only in a provisional ("critical") way; for Rupp, under ideal epistemic conditions (e.g., the Peircian "end of inquiry"), one final conceptualization of ultimate reality will emerge as absolute truth. In the final part of this essay a version of the relativistic model implicit in Rupp's approach is defended against both the Kantian model of Hicks et al. and Rupp's Hegelian-Peircian model, which, it is argued, is incompatible certainly with the spirit of his own typological-structural analysis, if not with the letter. In challenging what Rupp calls the truth of Zen, it is further argued that not only is more than one salvific structural possibility available to us through the different world religions but also that realizing these possibilities is principally a human responsibility, and that the cosmos is quite indifferent to and compatible with several possibilities, from the most destructive to the most conducive to human well being and flourishing. (shrink)

George Rupp's Beyond Existentialism and Zen, in its typological-structural analysis and model of religious pluralism, proffers an alternative to the dominant Kantian models (e.g., by John Hicks and Sarvepalli Radhakrish- nan). The question for Rupp is not which religion is true and how to decide that issue-answered in the Kantian approach in terms of an unknowable Ding an sich that all religions, albeit imperfectly, try to approximate or conceptualize (i.e., God or the Transcendent)-but rather how do religions represent, at least (...) in principle, a structural possibility for salvation or human flourishing, however different and incompatible their distinct prima facie truth claims might be. Although the potential for a radically relativistic model is implicit in Rupp's approach, it is argued here that his Hegelian assumptions lead him to accept relativism only in a provisional ("critical") way; for Rupp, under ideal epistemic conditions (e.g., the Peircian "end of inquiry"), one final conceptualization of ultimate reality will emerge as absolute truth. In the final part of this essay a version of the relativistic model implicit in Rupp's approach is defended against both the Kantian model of Hicks et al. and Rupp's Hegelian-Peircian model, which, it is argued, is incompatible certainly with the spirit of his own typological-structural analysis, if not with the letter. In challenging what Rupp calls the truth of Zen, it is further argued that not only is more than one salvific structural possibility available to us through the different world religions but also that realizing these possibilities is principally a human responsibility, and that the cosmos is quite indifferent to and compatible with several possibilities, from the most destructive to the most conducive to human well-being and flourishing. (shrink)

In a time marked by the development of innovative treatments in healthcare and the need for health professionals to deal with resulting ethical dilemmas in clinical practice, this study was developed to determine the influence of the bioethics teaching on the moral competence of medical and nursing students. The authors conduct a longitudinal study using the Moral Competence Test extended version before and after attending the ethics curricular unit, in three nursing schools and three medical schools of Portugal. In this (...) questionnaire the participant is confronted with three ethical dilemmas and asked to evaluate arguments for and against the attitude of the main character. For both nursing and medical students, C-score was lower after the attendance of the ethics curricular units, with a statistically significant decrease in the total score for nursing students and a decrease not statistically significant for medical students. A multivariate analysis did not find any association between this decrease and gender, course, or age. The phenomenon of moral segmentation was observed, with better performance in the worker and judge dilemma, than in the doctor dilemma. These results highlight the need to reflect on the curricular strategies that can be implemented for health professionals to better develop moral competence and decision-making, allowing for the provision of humanized health care. (shrink)

Ontological expressivism is the view that ontological existence claims express non-cognitive mental states. I develop a version of ontological expressivism that is modeled after Gibbard’s (2003) norm-expressivism. I argue that, when speakers assess whether, say, composite objects exist, they rely on assumptions with regard to what is required for composition to occur. These assumptions guide their assessment, similar to how norms may guide the assessment of normative propositions. Against this backdrop, I argue that “some objects have parts”, uttered in the (...) context of an ontological disagreement, expresses a noncognitive disposition to assess the truth of propositions by using only rules of assessment according to which the proposition that some objects have parts is to be evaluated as true. (shrink)

El artículo, con base en un argumento de Michel Foucault: la vigencia –desde el siglo XVIII hasta hoy- de las estrategias liberales del poder para el gobierno de la población, hace una reflexión sobre la escuela actual. Argumenta que la democracia, en cuanto concreción visible de esas estrategias de poder, comporta procesos específicos en la escuela que son nombrados aquí, provisionalmente, como el tránsito desde una escuela disciplinada hasta otra conflictiva, violenta, terapéutica y falta de autoridad, es decir, indisciplinada. Pero, (...) y es el argumento fundamental, en la actualidad, más que invocar mayores cotas de libertad y de democracia para la escuela, se requiere reconocer las formas de sujeción de ese liberalismo democrático, y con ello, tal vez, proponer otras formas de estar en la escuela y en la sociedad. (shrink)

La simplicidad desde la mirada poética es un asunto que, lejos de ser “inoficioso”, puede convertirse en una herramienta humana para asumir el riesgo de la existencia. Cuando el hombre vive en la simplicidad lo que hace es entablar una relación desnuda y directa con el mundo: se deja asombrar cada día, se sumerge en una felicidad en acto. Muchos poetas han sabido que a través de un lenguaje sobrio y, digamos, esencial es posible celebrar la simplicidad, y que ello (...) resulta ser un ejercicio tan válido como revelador. Creer en la simplicidad es creer en el entusiasmo. Vivir en la simplicidad es asumir una seria responsabilidad.  . (shrink)

In the mid-1970s, the fascist-leaning dictatorships in Spain (1939–1977) and Portugal (1933–1974) fell. Closely linked to the 1973 oil crisis, debates over energy and technology policies became very prominent during the ensuing political redefinition of both countries. Two decades after the first international agreements between the Iberian regimes and the United States for the development of nuclear programs, a myriad of movements of social resistance to nuclear technology emerged in dialogue with anti-nuclear organizations in other European countries. Fun and playfulness (...) have been used for top–down popularization and banalization of nuclear technologies since the 1950s, but here pleasant forms of resistance also played a central role in contesting national energy plans, expert discourses, and vested interests. This article explores what we call “anti-nuclear fun,” the use of amusement, play, and humor as political and epistemic tools to familiarize society with the exceptional and daily risks of the “peaceful atom.”. (shrink)

While available to a multitude, routine health precautions and basic, nonspecialized medical services are lacking in many societies. This may in part be the outcome of attitudinal distortions, not only at the national and global levels, but fundamentally within the patient-physician encounter. Demands for a disturbance-free subsistence clash with values of power and control within health-care sub-systems resulting in an overall neglect of primary needs and a distribution of medical services that benefits select groups. True needs are misrepresented and an (...) intensification of particular services does not fulfill one's duties toward those who realize little or no services at all. The entire institutional system of medicine requires a rebalancing of rights, intentions and outcomes, beginning with the correlative experiences of patient and physician. (shrink)

Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...) of it. Finally, I point out the main lesson to be derived from Kripke’s discussion--namely, that there is nothing which is common and peculiar to what we call following a rule. (shrink)